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ABSTRACT
Virtualization of Internet of Things(IoT) is a concept of dy-
namically building customized high-level IoT services which
rely on the real time data streams from low-level physi-
cal IoT sensors. Security in IoT virtualization is challeng-
ing, because with the growing number of available (build-
ing block) services, the number of personalizable virtual
services grows exponentially. This paper proposes Service
Object Capability(SOC) ticket system, a decentralized ac-
cess control mechanism between servers and clients to effi-
ciently authenticate and authorize each other without us-
ing public key cryptography. SOC supports decentralized
partial delegation of capabilities specified in each server/-
client ticket. Unlike PKI certificates, SOC’s authentication
time and handshake packet overhead stays constant regard-
less of each capability’s delegation hop distance from the
root delegator. The paper compares SOC’s security bene-
fits with Kerberos and the experimental results show SOC’s
authentication incurs significantly less time packet overhead
compared against those from other mechanisms based on
RSA-PKI and ECC-PKI algorithms. SOC is as secure as,
and more efficient and suitable for IoT environments, than
existing PKIs and Kerberos.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Key management; Authen-
tication; Access control; Authorization; •Networks →
Network security; Security protocols;
Keywords
Key Management; Authentication; Access Control; Internet-
of-Things; Virtualized Services; Access Control
1. INTRODUCTION
As the number of IoT devices increases, multiple IoT de-
vices are likely to collaborate to address high-level issues
such as comprehensive data aggregation, analysis and pro-
cessing. As a consequence, IoT devices providing services
can be dynamically composed or virtualized [1–3], hence fa-
cilitating re-use of IoT services. IoT virtualization is a con-
cept of dynamically building customized high-level IoT ser-
vices which rely on the real-time I/O data streams from low-
level IoT sensors/actuators. An IoT device having access to
the Internet can potentially interact with any other IoT de-
vices in the world, exchange data with them, and thereby
creating a customized virtual service for its own clients. Vir-
tualized IoT services provide scalability to build large-scale
pervasive systems, and they can be dynamically composed
and disbanded according to the requirements and context.
Meanwhile, security becomes complex because a virtu-
alized IoT service is a composition of many IoT devices.
Virtualized IoT services may have complicated service de-
pendency, and virtualization may occur not only within a
closed local network but through external open networks
governed by mutually untrusted administrators or organi-
zations [4]. Furthermore, virtualized IoT services may be
re-virtualized in a recursive manner. A client who wishes to
use a virtual IoT service needs to verify if it indeed has the
capability of providing the claimed virtual service. Like-
wise, the server needs to verify if the client is authorized
to use the requested virtual service. Even if IoT services
become virtual in a highly recursive manner, the mutual se-
curity verification process between the client and server has
to remain light-weighted; otherwise it becomes difficult to
support resource-constrained IoT devices.
As a solution for the aforementioned security problems,
this paper proposes a Service Object Capability (SOC) tick-
eting system that allows each server and client to efficiently
authenticate and authorize each other in a dynamic envi-
ronment where virtual services can be created in highly re-
cursive and decentralized manner. SOC uses dynamically
created secret passcodes, generated by a security ticket is-
suer, as a secret to enable each server and client to mu-
tually authenticate each other. Each trusted ticket issuer
creates two types of passcodes: S (Server) passcode and C
(Client) passcode. The ticket issuer gives out these pass-
codes to its approved clients or servers, and the holder of
passcode(s) can delegate them to other entities. For each
service, server passcodes are generated as a one-way hash
chain [5] by recursively applying an one-way hash function
to the issuer-created server seed, and such created hash val-
ues are sequentially one-to-one mapped to distinct timeslots
in a reverse time order. Thus, the holder of a particular
passcode can compute any other passcodes mapped to past
timeslots by using the same one-way hash function, while it
is not possible to compute any other passcodes mapped to
future timeslots. This non-invertibility of passcodes securely
enforces an expiry on each passcode, because in SOC, each
passcode is valid and usable only during its assigned times-
lot. One the other hand, each service’s client seed and client
passcodes are different and randomly chosen per client by
the trusted ticket issuer. In addition, each client passcode
comes with a ‘hint ’, an encryption of the client passcode
by its corresponding server passcode (where both C/S pass-
codes are mapped to the same timeslot). The client authen-
ticates the server by checking if it it can decrypt the hint
with the server passcode, while the server authenticates the
client by checking if it knows the decrypted value of the hint,
which is the client passcode. This way, they mutually au-
thenticate without revealing the server’s secret passcode to
the client. At the end of SOC authentication, both the client
and server establish a shared session key. SOC’s computa-
tional overhead is lower than any other PKI-dependent IoT
security framework, because its authentication only depends
on symmetric key cryptography and one-way hash function.
This paper’s contributions are as follows:
• Proposing SOC ticket solution as a lightweight and ef-
ficient mechanism for securing personalizable IoT ser-
vice virtualization. SOC’s decentralized access control
is computationally more efficient and suitable for IoT
environments.
• Proposing a lightweight security solution allowing each
server to delegate its service capabilities to facilitate
service virtualization. The delegator can optionally re-
duce the service capability to be delegated The holder
of server and client tickets mutually authenticate each
other’s capability without using public key cryptogra-
phy.
• Keeping the authentication time and handshake packet
overhead constant for a server and client’s mutual au-
thentication and authorisation regardless of the service
virtualization level (i.e. the service delegation distance
from their root delegators)
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II presents
virtualized IoT use cases and a set of security requirements.
Section III introduces the Service Object Capablity (SOC)
architecture, describing the ticket issuance, security hand-
shake, authentication and authorization, as well as delega-
tion and revocation. In Section IV, we presents the im-
plementation of SOC architecture and its experimental re-
sults, while Section V provides some discussion. Section VI
presents related work and we conclude the paper with future
work in Section VII.
2. SMART LIVING USE CASES AND SE-
CURITY REQUIREMENTS
This section describes a smart IoT service network as a
comprehensive use case to derive the operation and security
requirements.
Figure 1 describes an exemplary smart IoT network,
which will be used throughout the whole section. It shows
a scenario in which different kinds of locks, i.e., home lock,
work (office) lock, and car lock with computational capabil-
ities can be locally and remotely managed by using a smart-
phone or a digital key. By using a smartphone, the user
Home Lock Work Lock Car Lock
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Figure 1: A smart IoT service network
is able to lock, unlock and log the door, assuming that the
home lock offers its service object, “SmartHomeLock”. The
Lock/Unlock commands correspond to executing a command
to physically lock/unlock the door, while log command cor-
responds to querying the lock/unlock history of the home
lock. The same capabilities and services are provided by the
work lock and the car lock in this case. Access capability
can also be granted to the digital key to lock/unlock/log any
of the locks in the system. From this scenario, we derive the
basic security requirements as follows:
• HomeLock should be able to enforce independent ac-
cess control on each of its three different service meth-
ods, i.e., lock/unlock/log . Specifically, home lock should
allow smartphone to query logs and lock the door, but
shouldn’t allow it to unlock the door. The rationale
for this is that if the user’s smartphone is stolen, the
attacker will not be able to gain access to the user’s
home. However, the home lock will allow the digital
key to both lock/unlock the door, but it can’t query
about logs, because the key does not physically have
an LCD screen to display the received log file to the
user.
• Defect Scanner is a service to perform system check
on the locks. In this case, it should be able to query
all the locks’ logs to analyse their system defect and
perform lock/unlock operation to test their functional-
ity. Once the lock passes all security checks, the defect
scanner approves their corresponding service capabil-
ity, certifying that the locks are genuine and authentic.
• Smartphone and Digital Key should be granted per-
mission to access the lock services provided by the
home/work/car locks. At the same time, they should
also obtain a certification from the defect scanner to
ensure that the lock services are genuine.
The use case can be extended further to dynamically cre-
ate a virtualized IoT service called“SmartAllLock”as shown
in Figure 2. In many cases, permission and service provi-
sioning can be delegated to authorized parties, and they
may optionally be weaken to be delegated, such as shorten-
ing the permitted time to access a service, removing some
service methods, or changing the permission types.
As shown in Figure 2, the Smart Security Server has been
delegated by Home Lock, Work Lock and Car Lock to pro-
vide their respective services. This also implies that the
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Security Server
Virtualized Service: “SmartAllLock”
- Methods: AllLock, AllLog
Service: “SmartHomeLock”
- Methods: Lock, Log
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Figure 2: A virtualized service called“SmartAllLock”, which
depends on three lower-level service objects delegated from
three locks.
Smart Security Server is capable of inventing its own service
object based on its delegated service objects. The object in-
vented in such a way is called a virtualized object [6], [3],
whose purpose is to provide a high-level service based on
integrating data, resource or services offered from low-level
service objects. The first usefulness of the service delegation
is, when the locks have poor internet connection while the
user is far away, it may instead connect to the fast home
security server having both good internet connection and
good local network connection with local locks. Thus, the
user may send a service request to the Smart Security Server,
instead of the individual lock. The second usefulness of the
service delegation is, the Smart Security Server can invent a
virtualized service object that gives a convenient high-level
interface of controlling all three locks simultaneously in an
easier manner instead of contacting each lock individually at
a time. In this case, the role of theSmart Security Server is
different from a local firewall for locks, because these locks
(i.e. home, work, car) may not in the same local network.
The Smart Security Server offers its users the following
three high-level operations: First, to view the system logs
and lock history of the home lock, work lock and car lock
all at once. Second, to execute a lock command on all three
locks at once. These new operations are provided as the
Smart Security Server ’s two virtualized service object meth-
ods: [“S-Server:/AllLock”] and [“S-Server:AllLog”]. In this
model, the Smart Security Server is more than a proxy be-
tween the client and each smart lock, because it actively
makes its own service available to the smartphone, rather
than simply forwarding data packets of lower-level servers
to the client from the middle. To this end, we further add
the following security requirements:
• Home/Work/Car Lock should be able to delegate its
service provisioning to a trusted entity such as the
Smart Security Server to handle service requests from
clients.
• Smart Security Server which has been delegated the
corresponding services by Home/Work/Car Lock should
be capable of handling the service requests on behalf
of the low-level service objects.
• Smart Security Server which is a virtualized service
can grant capability to smartphone or digital key to
access its new virtual service. Similarly, it also has to
prove to its client that it is capable of providing the
new virtualized service.
3. SERVICE OBJECT CAPABILITY (SOC)
ARCHIECTURE
3.1 Overview
This subsection defines key terms and functions which are
necessary to describe SOC.
Service Object : It can refer to a variety of things: a single
file, a bundle of files, a system resource, a network service,
a service port, etc. Each service object’s name has to be
uniquely identifiable within a network, just like URIs. One
way of enforcing it is to represent each name as a combina-
tion of a server’s IP address and its unique service name. In
SOC model, we assume that each service object’s name is
publicly known- or publicly reachable- by any entities in the
network, just as every website visitor already knows or can
learn the website’s URL.
SOC tickets: They are used by two communicating entities
to prove one’s own capability and to validate the opponent’s
capability. There are two ticket types: C (Client) ticket and
S (Server) ticket. A client ticket is required for proving one’s
eligibility to use a particular service object, while a server
ticket is used to prove one’s eligibility to provide a particular
service.
Ticket Issuer : An entity who issues SOC tickets. The
ticket issuer is the root of trust in our scheme, analogous to
a certificate authority (CA) in PKI. An issuer defines each
of its ticket’s capability type (C/S), targeting service object,
the list of approved sub-services for that service object, the
ticket’s expiry, and secret passcodes as the ticket’s secret
credential to prevent illegal capability forging. The detailed
passcode mechanism is illustrated in Section 3.2.
Any trusted entity can become a ticket issuer: a human
user, an OS kernel, a device, an application process, a server,
a client, or a third party process, etc. Each ticket issuer has
to be uniquely identifiable within a network, in order to
differentiate tickets issued from different issuers. As such,
each issuer puts its unique fingerprint on every ticket it is-
sues, which is an integer large enough (e.g. 32 bytes) not to
coincidentally overlap with other issuer’s fingerprint. Fin-
gerprints exist only to help ticket holders sort their tickets
by issuer. Each ticket holder verifies its ticket in the sense
that its secret passcodes were confidentially transmitted by
its ticket issuer (e.g. via secure communication channel or
NFC).
Our framework assumes ticket holders know and trust
their ticket issuers. Tickets need not be signed by the is-
suer, because ticket holders do not need to use public keys to
verify each other’s ticket, but with their tickets’ secret pass-
codes confidentially given by their issuers. Issuers grants
tickets with their associated passcodes.
The role of a ticket issuer is to approve whether a particu-
lar entity may have server/client capabilities for some target
[service, method], and also to provide a mechanism for the
holders of C/S tickets targeting the same [Service:Method]
to authenticate each other’s client/server capability for the
target. This means, the server ticket holder validates if the
client ticket holder is eligible to request for a particular ser-
vice or sub-service (i.e. [service, method]), while the client
ticket holder validates if the server ticket holder is a trust-
worthy source of that service. One ticket is a counterpart of
another ticket if both tickets have the the common [service,
method] target parameter but their capability types are op-
posite: One is a client type and the other a service type. The
way the counterpart C/S tickets validate the genuinness of
each other is done by matching their secret passcodes, which
is discussed in depth in Section 3.2.
C〈issuera, ServiceObj, MethodList, IsValidator, Expiry〉
This represents a client capability ticket for ServiceObj ’s
method list, MethodList, which is issued by issuera. An en-
tity who wants to use ServiceObj ’s particular method that
is part of MethodList can use this ticket to the server servic-
ing ServiceObject to prove its eligibility and authorization.
This ticket is a capability proof that its holder is approved
by issuera to use a particular service method belonging to
MethodList in ServiceObj. This ticket expires at timeslot
Expiry. This ticket can also be used as a validator to check
if the server is approved by issuera to service ServiceObject ’s
MethodList.
S〈issuera, ServiceObj, MethodList, IsValidator, Expiry〉
This represents a server capability ticket for ServiceObj ’s
method list, MethodList, which is issued by issuera. This
ticket expires at timeslot Expiry. A server servicing Ser-
viceObj ’s MethodList requires this ticket to be presented to
its clients to prove its server capability in the similar manner
as aforementioned.
3.1.1 One-way Authentication
There are cases where mutual authentication is unneces-
sary, but only one-way authentication is required. For in-
stance, suppose a system defect scanner scans various service
devices to check their system integrity, and after passing all
checks the scanner issues them S capability tickets for servic-
ing their services. Then, the scanner issues the counterpart
C tickets to external clients who is willing to use those ser-
vice devices. The clients’ C tickets are used to validate if
the server device(s) they communicate with has the valid S
ticket issued by the defect scanner. This scenario’s security
enforces that if the client holds an C ticket issued by the de-
fect scanner but a particular service device doesn’t have the
counterpart S ticket, the device is not validated by client and
thus the client rejects the service; but if the client doesn’t
hold defect scanner’s C ticket while the server device has the
S ticket, server device should not deny offering its service to
the client even if the client doesn’t have the counterpart C
ticket. This is because the role of the S ticket issued by
the defect scanner is to prove its holder’s(server’s) server
capability to its counterpart C ticket holder(client), but the
client’s C ticket is not designed as a proof for the client ca-
pability to use the service, because the defect scanner only
deals with service device integrity in this scenario. In other
words, the defect scanner designed and created its C tick-
ets as validators for clients to validate the server’s S tickets.
Thus, we introduce an extra flag in each (S and C) ticket
denoting if the ticket issuer designed the ticket for validating
its counterpart ticket or not. To this end, there is “IsValida-
tor” flag field in each SOC ticket. For the defect scanner’s C
tickets, this field’s value is marked as “V(Validator)”, but for
the defect scanner’s S tickets, this field’s value is “N(Non-
Validator)”. In the previous file sharing example, this field’s
value is “V” for both S and C tickets, because those tickets
are designed for mutual capability validation between the
server and client. It is the ticket issuer who is responsible
for properly marking isValidator field, as it defines the usage
of each ticket.
3.1.2 Multi-Issuer Authentication
Authorising clients can be done by another independent
issuer who is specialized in approving human clients and
their personal devices. Such scenario ends up involving more
than a ticket issuer. For instance, if the maintenance of a
security door lock sensor belongs to both the laboratory as
well as to the building management department, the security
door lock may need to check if the lock user is approved by
both the laboratory leader and the building manager to send
lock/unlock commands on it. To support this requirement,
SOC allows checking tickets issued from multiple issuers all
at once. In this case, the door requires its clients to hold
two C tickets: one issued by the lab manager and the other
issued by the building manager, whereas the client requires
the door lock to submit an S ticket issued by the defect scan-
ner. In total, the client and door lock hold three tickets in
each: client’s two tickets are non-validator and one ticket
is a validator, while the door lock’s two tickets are valida-
tors and one ticket s a non-validator. In fact, depending on
the ticket issuer’s design decision, the client’s two C tickets
from the building manager and laboratory header could be
designed as validators just like their counterpart S tickets.
For example, the C ticket issued by the building manager
can be designed as a validator, if it is also in charge of ap-
proving the service integrity of the door lock. The C ticket
issued by the laboratory leader would be designed as a non-
validator, if it is not in charge of approving the door lock’s
service integrity.
3.1.3 Fine-granularity Access Control
For the same service object, SOC can grant a capability
for each method independently. For example, a smart door
lock service may consist of three sub-services: querying sta-
tus history (e.g. the latest time the door was unlocked),
executing locking operation, and executing unlocking oper-
ation. We may want to give our smartphone the capability
to lock the door, so that it can remotely lock the door if
we suddenly realize having forgotten to lock the door when
leaving home. However, we may want to give the capability
for unlock method exclusively to our digital key that sup-
ports only NFC. The reason behind this is, smartphones are
generally prone to remote cyber attacks via Wifi or 3G, and
if they ever get compromised, an attacker can unlock our
home door and intrude, which is a lethal security threat.
On the other hand, a digital key supporting only NFC is
safer from remote cyber attacks because it does not support
remotely accessible network backdoors. To this end, the is-
suer can grant a specialized digital key device a C ticket
approving the capability for both [doorlock, lock] and [door-
lock, unlock] sub-services, while our smartphone another C
ticket approving the capability for only [doorlock, lock] sub-
service.
S1〈issuera, Svcn, MListm isVi, Exp1〉  S2〈issuera, Svcn, MListe,
isVi , Exp2〉 ⇐⇒ (MListm ⊆ MListe) ∧ (Exp1 ≤ Exp2 )
(1)
Given Equation 1, a particular SOC ticket can be con-
verted into any other reduced capability tickets whose target
sub-services, [service, methodList], are a subset of the orig-
inal ticket’s [service, methodList]. Furthermore, the dele-
gated ticket’s expiry can be shortened by the delegator. One
SOC ticket authenticates its client/server capability to the
holder of its counterpart ticket holder, and then in turn au-
thenticates the counterpart ticket.
Issuers(A, C, ServiceObj, Method, isVi): This function
outputs the set of issuers, based on all tickets A holds, who
have approved entity A the S(server) capability for servicing
[Service, Method]. isV i sets the requirement type of tickets
to be investigated, whose type can be either V(validator) or
N(non-validator).
Issuers(A, C, Servicen, Methodm, isVi)
= {issuera | C〈issuera, Servicen, Methodm, isVi〉 ∈ Tickets(A)}
Issuers(A, S, Servicen, Methodm, isVi)
= {issuera | S〈issuera, Servicen, Methodm, isVi〉 ∈ Tickets(A)}
(2)
Equation 2 describes the function Issuer, which extracts
the list of all issuers who issued A tickets whose capability
target is [Servicen, Methodm], capability type is either client
(first equation) or server (second equation), and validator
type is isVi.
A
[Svcn, Mm]⇐======= B, iff
Issuers(A, C, Svcn, Mm, V/N) ⊇ Issuers(B, S, Svcn, Mm, V)
AND
Issuers(A, C, Svcn, Mm, V) ⊆ Issuers(B, S, Svcn, Mm, V/N)
(3)
Equation 3 describes the finalized SOC mutual authen-
tication check that takes place whenever a client attempts
to use a particular service object offered by a server. In the
equation, A is a client and B a server. A is allowed to use
[Servicen, MethodM] serviced by B if and only if the fol-
lowing two conditions hold. First, B’s every trusted ticket
issuer who instructed B to authenticate the client’s client
capability for [Servicen, MethodM] (by having issued B a
validator -marked S ticket) has to also have approved A of
using [Servicen, Methodm] (by having issued A the counter-
part C capability ticket). Likewise, A’s every trusted ticket
issuer who instructed A to authenticate the server’s server
capability for [Servicen, MethodM] (by having issued A a val-
idator -marked C ticket) has to also have approved B of the
server capability on [Servicen, MethodM] (by having issued
B the counterpart S capability ticket).
SOC allows issuers of physical (lower-level) services to
selectively delegate their ticket issuance role of particular
[Servicen, Methodm] to a ticket issuer of a virtual (higher-
level) service. Therefore, clients of the virtual service only
need to contact the ticket issuer of the virtual service in order
to retrieve all necessary tickets to verify an entity offering
this virtual service.
3.2 Ticket Issuance and Generation
This section discusses the structure of SOC tickets and
how the ticket validation mechanism works between ticket
holders.
Each ticket is locally generated by a ticket issuer’s device.
The issuer device may be the service provider itself, or it can
be a third party device who does not provide the service.
The genuineness of a particular C ticket can be verified only
by using its genuine counterpart S ticket, and vice versa.
Each S ticket comes with a set of secret passcodes generated
from its issuer’s secret seed.
In a ticket, each [service, method] target comes with a
passcode as a capability credential. Every passcode has a
one-to-one mapping to a distinct timeslot as its expiry (see
Table 1), and for each service, passcode chains are gener-
ated by applying a crypto-hash function in a reversed or-
der of timeslots on the ticket issuer’s initial seed. There-
fore, an entity having a certain passcode mapped to a cer-
tain timeslot is capable of recursively generating any other
passcodes whose targeting [service, method] are the same
but mapped to past timeslots, by using the same crypt-
hash function used by the ticket issuer to generate passcode
chains. However, it cannot generate any passcodes mapped
to future timeslots because that’s equivalent to an inverse
of the crypto-hash function, which is computationally in-
feasible. As such, the use of each passcode is bound to its
mapped timeslot, and it becomes unusable as the current
time passes its mapped time. This way, each passcode has
its own expiry.
The middle box in Table 1 describes an example where
the issuer issues to ServerA a server passcode expiring at
timeslot 80, and issues to ClientA two client passcodes and
hints valid for timeslot 10 and 11, respectively. The bottom
box in Table 1 describes an example of mutual authentica-
tion between ServerA and ClientA at timeslot 10. ClientA
sends to ServerA its hint for timeslot 10 (as well as its C
ticket), then ServerA decrypts it and gets the client pass-
code. Finally, ServerA sends the client a random session
key encrypted with ClientA’s passcode. If the client holds
client passcodes for multiple services/methods, s/he sends
a hint corresponding each service/method, and the server
decrypts each hint with the corresponding server passcode.
SOC scheme requires that IoT devices using SOC tickets
have the ability to keep time and adjust it once every while
by querying their local or global clock server(s). Ticket hold-
ers are allowed to have time drift as big as the window size
of their ticket’s timeslot.
For simplicity, all hexadecimal numbers in the Figure 3
are represented as 10-byte-long numbers. The actual SOC li-
brary implementation uses security enhanced 32-byte SHA256
hash values. Figure 3 shows an example of S〈HomeLock,
“SmartHomeLock”, Lock & UnLock, Validator〉 ticket, which
consists of its issuer’s unique fingerprint, service name or
method, ticket type (i.e. S), an expiry, and validator flag.
The Issuer’s Seed Era represents the seed version used for
generating this ticket’s passcodes. Unit Timeslot Length is
the atomic length of each timeslot used for this type of ticket
by its issuer, which are crucial information for two commu-
nicating ticket holders when they negotiate their common
An example of an issuer’s C/U Ticket Passcode Generation Table
Target (service, method) = (“SmartHomeLock”, “Lock”)
ServerA Passcode ClientA Passcode ClientA Hint
Time=0 h180(seed) rand(A,0) Encrypt{rand(A,0)}h180(seed)
Time=1 h179(seed) rand(A,1) Encrypt{rand(A,1)}h179(seed)
...... ...... ...... ......
Time=80 h100(seed) rand(A,80) Encrypt{rand(A,80)}h100(seed)
...... ...... ...... ......
Time=178 h2(seed) rand(A,178) Encrypt{rand(A,178)}h2(seed)
Time=179 h1(seed) rand(A,179) Encrypt{rand(A,179)}h1(seed)
[Issuer’s Ticket (Passcode) Assignment to ServerA, ClientA and ClientB]
ServerA ← Issuer: h100(seed) (=⇒this server passcode is usable until Timeslot=80)
ClientA ← Issuer: rand(A,10),rand(A,11), Hint(A,10),Hint(A,11) (=⇒these clientA passcodes are usable for Timeslot=10, 11 )
[Mutual Authentication Steps between ClientA ↔ ServerA at current Time=10]
1. ClientA → ServerA : Hint(A,10) (=⇒this hint is valid for Timeslot=10)
1. ClientA → ServerA : ServerA derives h170(seed), decrypts Hint(A,10) with it, and gets rand(A,10).
2. ClientA ← ServerA : Encrypt{SessionKey}rand(A,10)
1. ClientA → ServerA : ClientA derives (decrypts) the server’s response with rand(A,10) and get SessionKey.
Table 1: A ticket issuer’s SOC ticket generation table for server passcode, client passcode and client hint. h is a SHA256 crypto-hash
function and seed is the issuer’s initial seed commonly used for generating common passcodes for all servers for the same service, whereas
rand is a randomly chosen client seed for generating unique client passcodes for each new client.
passcodes to verify each other’s capability. As described in
Table 1, each (server and client) passcode is mapped to
its unique expiry timeslot, and the ticket issuer generates
a chain of passcodes for S tickets by recursively applying
each of its secret seed on a crypto-hash function. Each of
the generated hash chain is sequentially mapped to expiry
timeslots in reversed time order, as shown in Table 1. This
table’s example simplifies the passcode management to be
indended for a single [service, method], and the issuer man-
ages passcodes for 180 timeslots. Whenever the issuer issues
a server ticket, it picks (or computes) the particular pass-
code corresponding to the desired expiry and gives it with
the ticket. When the issuer issues a client ticket, the is-
suer issues the client passcode only for the current timeslot,
thus a client ticket is valid only for a single timeslot. While
the server’s passcode concerns hash chain mechanism, the
client’s passcode does not concern hash chaining, and it is
simply a random number credential valid only for a single
timeslot. In addition, the issuer computes client passcode
hints (by encrypting the client passcode with its counter-
part server passcode corresponding to the current timeslot).
The duration of each timeslot is designed by the issuer at
setting. If each timeslot is long (e.g. 1 day), the issuer needs
not be online to frequently renew client passcodes. If each
timeslot is designed to be short (e.g. 1 hour), it’s easy to re-
voke clients responsively, while the issuer can issue the client
several future passcodes and hints at once, so that it does
not have to renew the ticket every hour.
3.2.1 Server(S) Ticket Structure
Figure 3 and 4 are examples of the data structure of SOC
tickets for S type and C type, respectively.
Suppose Table 1’s unit timeslot is 1 day. Thus, each client
passcode is valid for 1 day, and each server’s passcode ex-
piry granularity is 1 day. The mutual authentication steps
in Table 1 is similar to how Kerberos client and server au-
thenticates each other. Our approach extends it by adding a
dimensionality to the client and server secrets based on one-
way hash chain relationships. Even if an attacker hijacks
S〈HomeLock, “SmartHomeLock”, Lock & UnLock, Validator,
Exp1〉
{ Secret Ticket ID: (32-byte long value)
Issuer (Fingerprint): HomeLock
Issuer Seed Era: 15
Service Name: “SmartHomeLock”
Methods: Lock, Unlock
Ticket Type: S (Service)
IsValidator: V (Yes)
Expiry: 2015.09.15.23:30
Unit Timeslot Length: 1 minute
}
Passcode {
Lock 0xc6s27d7b09b89a571bd7
Unlock 0xbc6s27d9a57bd77b0981
}
Figure 3: An example of a S (server) ticket and its corre-
sponding S passcodes
packets in step 1 to get the client’s hint, it is impossible
to do a replay attack, unless the attacker holds the server’s
passcode to decrypt the hint to get the client’s passcode.
Then, the server sends the client a random session key en-
crypted by the client’s passcode, as a proof that the server
succeeded in decrypting the client’s hint. Two parties end
up with the same session key only if both of their passcodes
are authentic. This mechanism allows the server and the
client to mutually authenticate, while keeping the server’s
passcode secret from the client.
3.2.2 Client(C) Ticket Structure
Client tickets have two differences from [Server] tickets.
In case of S tickets, if two tickets’ (service, method, ex-
piry) parameters exactly match, their passcodes are par-
tially shared (see subsection Delegation). In other words,
the servers whose S ticket’ target [service, method] match
and valid for the same (or overlapping) time period share
the common secret. On the other hand, the passcode for
C tickets is always randomly generated by the issuer even
if the two tickets’ (service, method, expiry) parameters are
the same.
As described in Table 1, when the issuer creates a C ticket,
it randomly chooses a C passcode for the user’s each capa-
bility target [service, method]. Then, for each passcode, it
encrypts each C passcode with its counterpart S (service ca-
pability) passcode whose timeslot corresponds to the current
time. This encrypted value is the hint for its corresponding
C passcode.
Each C ticket contains a client passcode and a hint for
each of its target [service, method]. A particular hint can
be decrypted only by the server ticket holder who can de-
rive the passcode with the same (service, method, expiry)
parameter as the C ticket’s hint. This is in resemblance
to Kerberos’ client ticket verification [7], where each client
ticket’s secret is encrypted by its target server’s secret key.
In SOC, a client holding a C ticket knows its ticket’s secret,
which is its C passcode, and its corresponding hint is an en-
cryption of the C passcode by the server’s S passcode. So,
the client can challenge the server with its hint to test if
the server can decrypt and get its client passcode. In turn,
holder of an S ticket can authenticate the holder of the C
ticket by verifying if the C ticket holder knows the decrypted
value of the provided hint, because the holder of the C ticket
cannot know the encrypted value inside the hint unless this
information has been provided by the ticket issuer who cre-
ated it. And the issuer will give this information only to an
authorised service user by issuing him a C ticket.
In essence, the SOC’s C ticket validation mechanism is an
extension of Kerberos’ client ticket validation mechanism,
because SOC leverages on expiry-timeslot-specific passcodes
for S and C tickets for their mutual ticket verification.
C〈HomeLock, “SmartHomeLock”, Lock & Unlock, Validator,
Exp2〉
{ Secret Ticket ID: (32-byte long value)
Issuer: HomeLock
Issuer Seed Era: 15
ServiceName: “SmartDoorLock”
Methods: Lock, Unlock
Ticket Type: C (Client)
IsValidator: V (Yes)
Expiry: 2015.05.14.10:00
Unit Timeslot Length: 1 day
Hint { // suppose current time is 2015.09.14.11:10
Lock 0x6b85710c2af79bd77d9b
0x128469cb1adb69af6b3c
Unlock: 0xfd10c276b859bd79b77a
0x2403bcb920306340c263
}}
Passcode { // suppose current time is 2015.09.14.11:10
Lock: 0xd77d9b2a571b879b0c63
0x23bda9b5dacb9a56cb95
Unlock: 0xfd10c276b859bd79b77a
0x6abf58af4fabc7a7f6b9
}
Figure 4: An example of a C (client) ticket and its corre-
sponding S passcodes
Figure 4 is an example of a particular C ticket’s data
structure. Its format appears almost the same as an S
ticket, except that it contains a hint for each passcode.
In this example, it has two passcodes, each of which is a
C capability proof for [HomeLock, lock ] and [HomeLock,
unlock ]. Each passcode is accompanied by a hint chain
whose length is 2, corresponding to two expiry timeslots
between the ticket’s issuing time (2015.05.14.11:10) and its
expiry(2015.05.15.23:30). When the holder of this C ticket
performs a mutual validation with the holder of its counter-
part S ticket, it selects one of two hints from its C ticket,
which should correspond to the earlier expiry timeslot be-
tween the C ticket and S ticket, and then sends this hint to
the S ticket holder to challenge if it can be decrypted using
the corresponding S passcode. The decrypted C passcode
will be used as part of their session encryption key.
Algorithm 1 describes how a ticket issuer generates S and
C passcodes. In the algorithm, passcodes denotes an S pass-
code and passcodec a C passcode.
Algorithm 1 Issuer’s S & C Ticket Passcode Generation
1: SEED ; . pre-defined secret seed for passcodes
2: MAX TIMESLOT ; . passcode table’s width
3: functionGet Passcode([service,method ], expiry, ticketType)
4: passcodeList := new ArrayList()
5: n = MAX TIMESLOT − Timeslot(expiry)
6: rowIndex := GetTableRow([serviceName,method ])
7: passcodes := hn(SEED + rowIndex)
8: if (ticketType == SERVICE)
return passcodes
9: else if (ticketType == CLIENT )
10: passcodec = randomNumber()
11: hint = Encrypt(passcodec)passcodes
return [passcodec , hint ]
12: end function
3.3 SOC Authentication and Authorization
This subsection extends the simplified server-client hand-
shake as described in Table 1 and gives a comprehensive
description of the SOC handshake. A ticket issuer manages
a table like Table 1 for all the [service, method] targets, and
use them to compose tickets for various [service, method]
targets. When multiple capability targets are used for veri-
fication between a client and server, they first agree on the
identical client passcode for each capability target based on
their mutual ticket header declaration, XOR all their derived
client passcode, and then the server uses it as an encryption
key to send a randomly chosen final session key. The pur-
pose of the XOR operation is to ensure all passcodes are
correct. That is, if ever one of their passcodes is wrong (or
randomly guessed), the final XORed value will not match
between the server and client, thus they cannot exchange
the same session key. The detail of the protocol is described
below.
1. IoTClient → IoTServer: “Client Hello”
2. IoTClient ← IoTServer: “Server Hello”
“Current Time”
“SOC Server Validator Ticket Declare”
3. IoTClient→ IoTServer: “SOC Client Validator Ticket Declare”
“Client Passcode Hints”
4. IoTClient← IoTServer:“EncryptC Passcodes{Rand Session Key}”
The above four steps describe the mutual SOC authenti-
cation between an (IoT) server and client during their initial
connection. The protocol assumes that the server can be a
virtual server that has been delegated service capability for
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Figure 5: An example of S passcode revocation tree for a par-
ticular [service, method] target. There is no revoked node, so the
issuer encrypts client hints with S15 server passcode.
multiple services, thus it holds multiple server tickets. Also
the client can hold more than one server ticket.
In step 1, the client sends a Client Hello to the server to
initiate a connection. In step 2, the server declares the cur-
rent timeslot to synchronize time between the client and
server. We advocate that the issuer should design each
timeslot to be large (e.g. 10 hours or 1 day), so that mi-
nor time skews between the server and client are not a crit-
ical issue. Should their times not agree with each other
more than a pre-set threshold, they use the time provided
by a publicly well-known clock server as their temporary
session time. Then, the server declares the header of its
validator-type server tickets for its tickets issued by one or
more issuers. There will be multiple services if the service
in concern is a virtual service comprising multiple low-level
services. The purpose of this header declaration is to require
the client to send corresponding hints in order for the server
to verify the client’s expected capability.
In step 3, for the server’s each (serviceName, issuer) header
declaration, the client should hold a counterpart client ticket
whose service name and issuer matches; Otherwise, the client
is not eligible and not authorized to use the service. This
client authentication corresponds to the first equation in
Equation 3. For all such client tickets, the client picks up
and sends the client passcode hints corresponding to the cur-
rent timeslot. In addition, the client sends the header of all
the validator-typed client tickets whose service name exists
in the ticket’s header declaration, which are for verifying the
server’s expected service capability. This corresponds to the
second equation in Equation 3. Then the client picks up and
sends the corresponding client passcode hints corresponding
to the current timeslot chosen by the server.
In step 4, if the server has all counterpart server tick-
ets corresponding to what the client has, it should be able
to decrypt all hints sent by the client in step 3 and derive
the client’s passcode in each of them. The server XORs all
client passcodes and use it as an encryption key to encrypt
a random session key chosen by the server. Then, the server
sends it to the client. In order for the client to decrypt
it, it also XORs all the client passcodes whose encryptions
were sent to the server, use it as a decryption key for the
server’s reply, and derive the server’s chosen random session
key. The fact that both parties reach the same session key in
the end proves that their expected capabilities are mutually
fully authenticated.
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Figure 6: The clone server SrvA6 has been revoked, so all nodes
comprising its path to the root are revoked. Accordingly, the
issuer encrypts future client hints with S5, S12, S13 server pass-
codes.
3.4 Ticket Delegation
A server ticket holder may delegate its server ticket to
another party. When delegating, the holder can optionally
remove some of its original ticket’s [service, method] capa-
bility targets (as well as their corresponding passcodes) in
order to weaken the delegated ticket’s capability. As pre-
viously described in Equation 1, the S ticket delegator can
reduce the expiry of the ticket by recursively computing the
passcode hashes as many times as needed to move their ex-
piry timeslots to earlier positions. It can also eliminate some
service methods (and their corresponding passcodes) in the
original ticket to reduce the number of sub-services (i.e. [ser-
vice, method] targets).
3.5 Ticket Revocation
Although SOC tickets become automatically unusable af-
ter their defined expiry, SOC also provides a ticket revoca-
tion mechanism which can revoke tickets before their expiry,
in case of system compromise. The ticket revocation mech-
anism is different for the client and server ticket. For client
tickets, revocation is straight-forward because each client
ticket contains its unique client passcodes. Thus, when the
issuer needs to revoke a particular client ticket, it sends the
target C ticket’s passcodes to its servers offering services
concerning the C ticket. Provided that the servers are al-
ways running, they can immediately receive client revoca-
tion messages from issuer(s) and reflect them, who in turn
pass it to their delegate servers. Alternatively, the issuer
can store revoked C passcodes in publicly accessible loca-
tion(s), like managing CRLs. The difference from CRL is
that the revoked passcodes need not be signed by the issuer,
because they were known only to the issuer and server(s)
who encountered them via client hints. Once a C passcode
is exposed to the public, it loses its validity, anyway. If the
ticket issuer itself is the server, it needs not contact others.
Revoking server tickets is slightly different, because server
passcodes are shared among the original server and its del-
egates. To this end, we leverage on a revocation mechanism
that is based on binary tree [8]. Figure 5 is an example of a
particular server passcode’s revocation tree. The passcode
tree is for a particular [service, method] target, and it is ini-
tially created by the ticket issuer before issuing any server
passcodes to others. The number of leaves is the maximum
number of allowed entities who can serve this same [service,
method]. When the initial server gets an S ticket from the
issuer, it receives this entire tree. The server assigns itself to
one of the leaf nodes, and whenever it delegates its ticket to
another entity, it maps the entity to an empty leaf node, and
in the ticket to be delegated it inserts a set of S passcode
instances occurring along the path from the new leaf to the
root. The binary tree in Figure 5 contains exactly four S
passcode instances for every path from the leaf to the root.
S0 to S15 are randomly generated by the issuer. Each entity
who got delegated S tickets will need to try each of these
four S passcodes to decrypt client hints.
Meanwhile, the issuer also manages this binary tree just
like the initial server. The issuer revokes a particular (dele-
gate) server by revoking all nodes comprising the path from
its leaf to the root, like in Figure 6. A tree’s active nodes
are those which are direct children nodes of every revoked
node in a tree. In Figure 6, as the issuer revokes Server-A6,
revoked nodes are marked as red and effective active nodes
after this revocation are updated and marked as blue. Ac-
tive nodes get updated after the issuer’s each revocation. If
no one is revoked, the active node is the root node alone by
default. When the issuer issues C tickets, for each C pass-
code it creates as many hints as the number of active nodes
by encrypting C passcode with each of their S passcode in-
stance. In Figure 5, the issuer creates each client’s passcode
hint with the S passcode instance in the root node (S15 ). In
case of Figure 6, the issuer creates hints with S5 ,S12 ,S13 ;
thus each C passcode comes with three hints. When clients
and servers verify each others, the client submits all the
three hints, and if the server can decrypt any of the hints,
that implies that server has not been revoked. An unrevoked
server will be able to decrypt exactly one of three hints and
get the C passcode. However, a revoked server won’t be able
to decrypt any of them, thus the client can safely reject the
server.
Delegate servers are to be revoked by the delegator server
or issuer. They revoke tree nodes (and their correspond-
ing S passcode instances) the same manner as revoking C
passcodes, by storing them in publicly accessible location(s).
However, the revoked C passcode is encrypted with the server
passcode, so that an attacker cannot know about the revoked
C passcode to impersonate the revoked client and use it to
to a server who has not updated this C passcode revoca-
tion information. Revoked S passcode instances need not
be signed by the issuer, provided only the issuer and servers
knew these secret passcodes. The randomness of S pass-
codes provide the equivalent security to the unforgeability
of digital signatures.
When the number of IoT service devices dynamically in-
creases, the issuer can increase the height of revocation tree
by dynamically adding a new root node. The issuer can
encrypt the new root node’s server passcode with existing
unrevoked server passcodes, and store them in the public
repository where revoked tree nodes are stored.
In case some server gets revoked after clients receive their
hints, they can determine which of their hints are to be
thrown away based on the information of revoked S passcode
instances: if any of them successfully decrypts a particular
client hint, the client should throw away that hint.
3.6 Revoking Recursively Delegated Tickets
When the initial server delegates his S ticket to others, it
can grant the delegate server more than one path in the tree,
by granting multiple S passcode instances covering multiple
paths, in order to allow further recursive delegation by the
delegatee. If the delegator server is to revoke its particular
delegatee, it has to revoke all paths given to the delega-
tee. Likewise, if the issuer is to revoke the initial server, it
should revoke the entire revocation tree, because the whole
tree was granted to the initial server. This cascading revoca-
tion mechanism is similar to cutting the trust chain in X509
certificates.
4. EXPERIMENT&SECURITYANALYSIS
4.1 Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented SOC as a C library of an OpenSSL wrap-
per. An existing application, regardless of whether it uses
a secure connection protocol (e.g. SSL, TLS, DTLS) or not,
can transparently adopt SOC passcode security framework
and use SOC library by adding one line of function call in
their original source code. Calling this function reads in
passcode files, generates passcode database in the memory,
performs passcode negotiation and ticket validation, and
computes the server and client’s final secure session key. For
those applications using SSL, TLS or DTLS, the SOC’s fi-
nal session key is arithmetically added to their original ses-
sion key in a transparent manner. As for other applications
not using OpenSSL’s SSL/TLS/DTLS protocols, they need
to call an additional function call around each system call
sending/receiving packets, but such source code modifica-
tion can be automatically patched given its original source
code. In this case, data buffer is encrypted or decrypted
with the final passcode before being sent to or received from
the network layer.
We tested the validation time and its total handshake
packet overhead, and compared them against the perfor-
mance of other security mechanisms based on ECC-PKI
and RSA-PKI which conduct the same security validation
between the server and client. The experiment was con-
ducted between two servers, physically located in Singapore
and San Francisco, respectively. Their CPUs were 32-bit
Dell 2.0GHz single core, and memory size was and 512MB.
We ran the experiment in two phases. First, we measured
the validation time and handshake packet overhead of three
cryptographic algorithms for different numbers of co-existing
dynamic services. Second, we measured their performance
by varying the average number of S ticket delegations, which
is equivalent to the average service virtualization level.
When we varied the number of co-existing dynamic ser-
vices with service ticket delegation (i.e. service virtualiza-
tion) being disallowed, three cryptographic validation mech-
anisms showed linear increases in their validation time. As
shown in Figure 7a, SOC produces a shorter validation time
than RSA-PKI or ECC-PKI algorithms because its crypto-
graphic computation does not use public key encryption. As
illustrated in Figure 7d, while their total packet size shows
a negligible difference, SOC always shows a slightly larger
packet size than RSA-PKI or ECC-PKI, because SOC re-
quires exchanging hints during its handshake, which can be
several in their numbers per ticket issued by the same issuer,
while RSA-PKI and ECC-PKI requires only exchanging a
single digital signature per certificate issued by the same is-
suer. Yet, the size of a signature or a hint is very small (32
bytes for SHA256), thus the packet size difference between
them is hardly distinguishable.
SOC’s major performance boost occurs when the recursive
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service virtualization is enabled. We fixed the number of co-
existing (i.e. correlated) dynamic IoT services to 100, and
gave variation on the average number of recursive S ticket
delegations (i.e. average service virtualization level). For
each service ticket delegation, ECC-PKI or RSA-PKI has to
create a new certificate and add it to the certificate chain,
which is imperative because of our premise that a ticket
delegator should be capable of optionally weakening its ser-
vice capability to be delegated. Meanwhile, SOC passcode
scheme’s validation time delay stays the same regardless of
the service virtualization level, because its ticket’s security
does not depend on digital signatures, but depends on the se-
crecy of C/S passcodes in each ticket. Therefore, SOC’s each
service capability delegation is equivalent to simply handing
over the ticket’s secret passcodes to the delegatees. Thus,
the size of each delegated ticket either stays the same or
rather decreases, because reducing a ticket’s capability is
equivalent to removing some of the existing passcodes or
hint buckets in the original ticket. As Figure 7c and 7d
show, SOC passcode’s validation time and handshake packet
overhead stays constant, while RSA-PKI or ECC-PKI algo-
rithms incur linearly increasing validation time and packet
overhead.
4.2 Security Analysis
Table 2 compares the SOC’s security features with other
equivalent mechanisms, Kerberos and X509 PKI, in the con-
text of a server’s service capability delegation (i.e. service
Security Features Kerberos X509 SOC
Service Capability Delegation x o O
Multiple Independent Ticket Issuers x o O
Client&Server Revocation o o O
Constant Authentication Overhead - x O
Regardless of Virtualization Level
Control on Further Virtualization - o O
Decentralized Ticket Management x o O
Table 2: Security feature comparison of SOC with Kerberos
and X509 in regards to service virtualization
virtualization). Kerberos does not support service capabil-
ity delegation, while SOC supports it by service passcode
trees and X509 PKI possibly by certificate chaining. X509
and SOC allow tickets (or certificates) to be issued and man-
aged by independent issuers in a decentralized manner. On
the other hand, Kerberos relies on a centralized ticket server
for managing all tickets, and it does not support multi-
perspective authentication requiring approvals from multiple
independent authorities (i.e. issuers). As for authentication
overhead, X509 PKI incurs extra length in its certificate
chain for every subsequent service delegation (i.e. service
virtualization), so its authentication overhead between the
server and client also grows linearly with the increasing num-
ber of service virtualization level- this is because the client
has to verify the server’s extra certificate chains. On the
other hand, SOC’s authentication overhead stays constant
(see Subsection 4.1) irrespective of service virtualization lev-
els. Both SOC and X509 allows servers to restrict on how
many more sub-delegations their delegatees can perform, in
order to hold service virtualization under control.
5. RELATEDWORK
While previous work [9] [10] [11] have focused on in-
corporating IoTs into clouds, we focus on decentralized IoT
security due to its unique advantages: decentralized IoTs are
managed in a decentralized manner, so IoT device owners
can have less worry about their data leakage, because they
manage their own data within their domain, and can have
more freedom and flexibility in their IoT service capability.
If our data get stored in the cloud, we never know what the
cloud providers will do with our data. Furthermore, data
traffic being exchanged between the clients and IoTs can
be possibly monitored by the cloud, and can be filtered or
altered by its implicit policies without the user’s notice.
Birgisson et al [12] proposes capability cookies, called
Macaroon, that can be delegated on the internet, and whose
condition can be set as stricter by the delegator. While
Macaroons are strictly for server use, SOC provides separate
tickets for both client and server, and they can mutually
validate each other by using their tickets.
In [13], a smart vehicle network is secured by appointing a
central security gateway, such that all incoming data packets
are inspected and sanitized before being delivered to any
vehicle nodes. Our solution differs in that we do not shift the
whole security management to a central gateway, but allow
individual IoT devices to be ticket issuers for their service
objects and configure their own security level for each of
their resources.
Virtualization of IoT nodes was introduced by Zhang et
al [1]. They developed a virtual sensor editor tool which cre-
ates a virtual representation of sensors (on a PC), based on
data streams imported from remote physical sensors. This
research assumed only a local network, and thus security
was not taken into account. We develop IoT virtualization
to be security-aware by using SOC passcode mechanism.
There has been a great deal of research on access control
(authentication and authorisation). [14] enforces attribute-
based access control for web services, whereas [15] uses role-
based access control for financial web systems. The closest
work to our research is [16] which realizes security control
in a decentralized network by means of a trusted entity, and
client certificates issued by it, to grant access to each IoT
resource. Our work extends their mechanisms because our
SOC can offer the feature provided by their work, plus allows
ticket delegation for both clients and servers.
[17] keeps a service device’s data secret when transferred
to a cloud, by encrypting them before storing in the cloud.
Each data field is encrypted using a different key, which is
shared only among intended clients or application servers.
While this preserves the confidentiality of each data field by
relying on multiple encryption keys, our security mechanism
preserves the security of each service object based on mul-
tiple SOC tickets along with dynamic passcodes associated
with each of them.
There is much research on securing ad hoc networks in a
decentralized manner. [18] and [19] proposes revocation al-
gorithms for bad nodes in an ad hoc network, based on votes
from neighbouring nodes. The core idea is to pre-define dif-
ferent keys for each time-frame of future, secure, end-to-end
connections between every device, and split them into mul-
tiple parts by using a multivariate, secret-sharing algorithm,
keeping each part in a separate IoT device. While this revo-
cation process is managed completely by the collaboration
of individual ad hoc nodes, SOC enables revocation by using
a revocation service who offers periodic heartbeat passcodes
to ticket holders upon their request.
[20] introduces a security mechanism to keep a user’s
password the same even after being compromised. It asso-
ciates the user’s password with a unique public key stored
in the user’s particular device, and user authentication re-
quires not only the user password, but also using the valid
public key. When the password is compromised, the user
only discard the public key in the compromised device. Our
passcode revocation mechanism doesn’t use PKI, but use
symmetric and hash algorithms, thus it is computationally
more efficient.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes SOC scheme that allows an IoT server
and client to securely and efficiently authenticate each other’s
capability especially for virtual IoT services. Unlike Ker-
beros built around dedicated central authority server (i.e.
KDC), SOC facilitates decentralized access control where
independent ticket issuers can participate in and the server
ticket holder can delegate his ticket to facilitate service vir-
tualization. The service ticket holders can monotonously
weaken the capability to be delegated in a decentralized
manner. This mechanism does not depend on public key
cryptography, and the authentication time and packet over-
head stays constant regardless of the number of delegation
hops (i.e. service virtualization level) from root delega-
tor. Our experimental results indicate SOC’s authentica-
tion time is approximately 0.21 of RSA-PKI and ECC-PKI
algorithms, and its authentication packet overhead is ap-
proximately 0.087 of RSA-PKI and ECC-PKI.
Although SOC’s symmetric encryption algorithm is faster
than RSA-PKI or ECC-PKI’s public key encryptions, in our
experiment this cryptographic computational advantage was
partially overshadowed by the network traffic. We believe
SOC’s benefit of computational efficiency will become more
conspicuous as more resource-constrained IoT devices than
ones in our experiment are used in various scenarios. Dis-
regarding this factor, SOC is still evaluated to be more effi-
cient than PKIs for highly dynamic environments with lots
of (virtual) IoT services interoperating with each other.
In our future work, we will address how to efficiently de-
termine the capability of each IoT service node and detect
failure or compromise of any particular nodes in real time
while the IoT scales up.
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